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Nous montrons que dans une industrie oligopolistique, les firmes ont
intérêt à utiliser le marché des permis de pollution comme moyen de coordonner
leur taux de production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, le marché des
permis de pollution peut créer une industrie avec des firmes asymétriques.
We show that when polluting firms are Cournot oligopolists, they may
have an incentive to use the market of pollution permits as a means of indirectly
coordinating their outputs. If firms are initially identical, trade in pollution permits
may result in an asymmetric oligopoly. The case where firms are initially
asymmetric is also considered.
Mots Clés : Permis de pollution, oligopole asymétrique
Keywords : Pollution permits, asymmetric oligopoly
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1 Introduction
Many economists have argued that tradeable pollution permits are bet-
ter than direct regulations that set rigid emission standards for all rms,
because trade in pollution permits allow individual rms to choose their
pollution levels that suit rm-specic demand and cost conditions that
are typically private information.
1
Several authors, however, have pointed
out that large rms may have an incentive to manipulate the permits
market. Misiolek and Elder (1987) point out that a dominant rm my
buy permits to raise rivals' costs. Newbery (1990, pp. 344-45) considers
a Cournot oligopoly with two identical rms; he shows numerically that,
for a given number of permits, under certain parameter values, aggre-
gate prot is minimized (but social welfare is maximized) if both rms
hold the same amount of permits. This indicates that rms have an
incentive to trade in permits, possibly at the expense of social welfare.
Von der Fehr (1993) shows that monopolization of the product market
may occur via trade in permits. Sartzetakis (1996) also considers permit
trading, but imposes asymmetry by assuming that one rm has price
setting power in the permits market.
In this paper we show that whether oligopolistic rms have an in-
centive to trade in permits depends on the degree of convexity of the
function relating unit production cost to emission level. If this function
is concave (or not `too' convex), then rms will trade in permits so as
to create signicant asymmetry in an ex-ante symmetric industry. By
not restricting to linear demand, we obtain a general characterization of
the nature of the solution. In particular, Newbery's example is shown to
belong to a subset of cases that we consider. Even if rms are initially
identical, their collusive behaviour in the allocation of pollution permits
among themselves may result in an asymmetric distribution of permits.
This is because the resulting cost asymmetry among rms will increase
industry prot. This phenomenon of\unequal treatment of equals" is a
special feature of a class of problems involving a two-stage (or multi-
stage) game among oligopolists who are rivals in the last stage.
2
The
case where rms are initially asymmetric will also be considered.
1
For some recent contributions to the literature on pollution permits, see Milliman
and Prince (1989), von de Fehr (1993), Sartzetakis (1996). For Pigouvian taxes and
standards, see Baumol and Oates (1988) and Barnett (1980).
2
See Salant and Shaer (1972, 1996). Long and Soubeyran (1997c) show that an
increase in the variance of the distribution of marginal costs will enhance industry
prot. For a more general treament, and applications, Long and Soubeyran (1997a,
1997b).
1
2 The Model
We consider an oligopoly consisting of n rms with non-identical cost
functions. They produce a homogenous nal good. The production
process generates pollutants. A pollution permit allows a rm to emit
one unit of pollutant per period. We assume that e
i
, the amount of
pollutant emitted by rm i, is an increasing function of its output level
and a decreasing function of of its stock of abatement equipment A
i
.
We write e
i
= f
i
(q
i
; A
i
). Thus, given A
i
, if rm i wants to produce
the quantity q
i
of output, the amount of pollution permits that rm i
needs is e
i
= f
i
(q
i
; A
i
): Assume that this function can be inverted to
give A
i
= a
i
(e
i
)v(q
i
), where a
0
i
(e
i
) < 0 and v
0
(q
i
) > 0. This means that,
for a given q
i
, the more pollution permits the rm has, the smaller is
the necessary stock of abatement equipment. We also assume that, in
addition, there is a raw material cost b
i
> 0 per unit of output. The
total cost of producing q
i
is then b
i
q
i
+ a
i
(e
i
)v(q
i
).
We consider a three stage game. In stage 1, the oligopolists col-
lectively lobby with the regulator to obtain e
0
permits per rm. The
greater is the lobbying eort, the greater is e
0
. We represent this by a
lobbying cost function (ne
0
) with 
0
> 0. An alternative interpretation
is that the oligopolists collectively purchase pollution permits from the
open market, and the cost of the total purchase of ne
0
units is (ne
0
)
which may or may not be a linear function, because their purchase may
aect the market price of the permits
3
.
In stage 2, each oligopolist buys (or sells) permits from other oligopolists.
Even if rms are ex-ante identical and have the same endowment of per-
mits, they may have an incentive to trade, because by redistributing
permits unevenly accross rms, the oligopolists are able to alter the dis-
tribution of marginal costs. We have shown elsewhere
4
that for any
given marginal cost sum C, an increase in the dispersion of marginal
costs (as measured by the variance), will increase aggregate prots, be-
cause while aggregate production and hence price remain constant, the
aggregate production cost falls due to the increase in the market shares
of lower cost rms. However, for a given number of permits, realloca-
tions of permits may change the marginal cost sum C. Another way
of putting this is: for a given marginal cost sum, a redistribution of
that sum may necessitate further purchase of permits, which may be
very costly. Therefore, whether rms will end up with an asymmetric
allocation of permits depends on the degree of convexity of the function
3
Clearly this model can be re-interpreted, with suitable modications, as one of
collective purchase of an intermediate input.
4
See Long and Soubeyran (1997c).
2
(ne) and of the relationship between emissions and reduction in unit
production cost.
The last stage of the game begins after the permits have been traded
among rms. Cournot rivalry in the product market gives equilibrium
prots as described below.
Let P (Q) denote the inverse demand function, where P
0
 0. Given
e
i
, rm i's marginal cost of production is b
i
+ a
i
(e
i
)v
0
(q
i
) Then, if
^
Q is
the Cournot equilibrium industry output
5
, rm i's equilibrium output
satises
q^
i
P
0
(
^
Q) + P (
^
Q) = b
i
+ a
i
(e
i
)v
0
(q^
i
)  
i
(1)
where 
i
is rm i's marginal cost at a Cournot equilibrium. The useful-
ness of our denition

i
= b
i
+ a
i
(e
i
)v
0
(q^
i
) (2)
will become clear as we proceed.
Summing (1) over all rms, we have
^
QP
0
(
^
Q) + nP (
^
Q) = n
N
where 
N
 (1=n)
P
i2N

i
. Hence
^
Q is a function of 
N
and is indepen-
dent of its components
6
, the 
i
's.
^
Q =
^
Q(
N
) (3)
and rm i's equilibrium output is
q^
i
=
P (
^
Q(
N
))  
i
[ P
0
(
^
Q(
N
))]
 q^
i
(
i
; 
N
) (4)
It follows from (2) and (4) that for a given 
N
, there is a one-to-one
relationship between the rm's quantity of pollution permits e
i
and its
marginal cost 
i
:
a
i
(e
i
) =

i
  b
i
v
0
[q^
i
(
i
; 
N
)]
(5)
In equibrium, rm i's abatement cost is
a
i
(e
i
)v(q^
i
) =
[
i
  b
i
]q^
i
(q^
i
)
5
For the existence of a Cournot equilibrium, see Gaudet and Salant (1991). We
assume that our demand and cost functions satisfy their sucient conditions for
existence and uniqueness.
6
This generalizes the result of Bergstrom and Varian (1985a,b) where they assume
constant marginal cost.
3
where (q
i
) is dened as the elasticity of v(q
i
): (q
i
) = q
i
v
0
(q
i
)=v(q
i
).
Equilibrium prot of rm i is
^
i
= q^
i
f
^
P   b
i
g+ f(
^
P   
i
)  (
^
P   b
i
)g[q^
i
=(q^
i
)]
Using
^
P   
i
= q^
i
^
P
0
, we can expressed equilibrium prot as
^
i
= (
^
P   b
i
)

1 
1
 (q^
i
)

q^
i
+ [ 
^
P
0
]
q^
2
i
(q^
i
)
(6)
Industry prot in equilibrium is
^
 =
X
i
^
i
= [ 
^
P
0
]
^
H +
X
i
(
^
P   b
i
)

1 
1
 (q^
i
)

q^
i
(7)
where
^
H is a \modied Herndahl index" of concentration:
^
H =
X
i2N
q^
2
i
(q^
i
)
From (7), if  (q^
i
) = 1, which is the case if v(q
i
) = q
i
, then, keeping total
industry output constant, industry prot is an increasing function of the
Herndahl index of concentration:
We now turn to stage 2 of the game, where rms buy or sell permits to
each other. In what follows, we consider only the case where v(q
i
) = q
i
,
for simplicity. In this case, from (2), with v
0
= 1 identically, we can write

i
= 
i
(e
i
), and the equilibrium gross prot of rm i in the last stage is
^
i
= ^
i
[
i
(e
i
); n
N
(e)] = [
^
P   
i
]q^
i
(
i
(e
i
); 
N
(e))
where

N
(e) =
1
n
X
i2N

i
(e
i
)
If no rm buys or sells permits, then rm i's net prot is
V
0
i
= ^
i
[
i
(e
0
); 
N
(e
0
)] 
1
n
(ne
0
)
Firm i has incentives to trade in permits if after trade it earns a prot
(inclusive of the revenue R
i
it gets from the sale of some or all of its
permits) that exceeds V
0
i
: Dene
V
i
(e
i
; e) = ^
i
[
i
(e
i
); 
N
(e)] 
1
n
(ne
0
)
4
We assume that trading takes the form of the Nash bargaining game
7
and that its outcome maximizes the Nash product Z
Z = 
i2N

V
i
(e
i
; e) +R
i
  V
0
i

(8)
where the maximization is with respect to (e
1
; :::; e
n
) = e and (R
1
; :::; R
n
) =
R, subject to the following constraints
X
i2N
R
i
= 0
V
i
(e
i
; e) +R
i
 V
0
i
X
i2N
e
i
= ne
0
(9)
Clearly, if (e

;R

) is the solution of this maximization problem then,
given e

, the optimal R

must satisfy the following conditions
R

i
=  V
i
(e
i
; e) + V
0
i
+
1
n
X
k2N

V
k
(e
k
; e)  V
0
k

(10)
This condition implies that each rm's net prot (including the net re-
ceipt R
i
) must exceed its status quo prot V
0
i
by a fraction 1=n of the
net surplus caused by the redistribution of permits. Substitute (10) into
(8) to obtain
Z =

1
n

n
"
X
i2N

V
k
(e
k
; e)  V
0
k

#
n
It follows that the optimal e

must maximize
X
k2N

V
k
(e
k
; e)  V
0
k

W
subject to (9). This is to be expected as aggregate surplus,W , must be
maximized in our cooperative bargaining problem.
Let's denote by e

(e
0
) the allocation of permits that results from this
bargaining problem. In Stage 1 of the game, the rms collectively choose
e
0
and together they incur the lobbying cost (ne
0
) :
max
e
0
X
i2N
[V
i
(e

i
(e
0
); e

(e
0
))  V
0
k
]  (ne
0
)
7
See Binmore et al. (1986).
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Instead of solving this problem recursively, knowing the solution
e

i
(e
0
) of the Stage 2's problem, it turns out to be more convenient to
solve the problems of Stage 1 and Stage 2 as a combined problem.
Let us assume that
a
i
(e
i
) = a
0
i
  r
i
(e
i
)
where r
i
(e
i
) can be interpreted as the reduction in rm i's unit cost of
production if the rm has e
i
permits. This function is assumed to be
dened over a compact range [0; e
max
i
]. Assume r
i
(0) = 0 and r
0
i
(e
i
) > 0,
for 0  e
i
 e
max
i
with r
i
(e
max
i
) = r
max
i
 a
0
i
. Inverting the function
to get e
i
= e
i
(r
i
) where 0  r
i
 r
max
i
. Then 
i
= b
i
+ a
0
i
  r
i
and

N
= b
N
+ a
N
  r
N
where
b
N
=
1
n
X
i2N
b
i
; a
N
=
1
n
X
i2N
a
i
; r
N
=
1
n
X
i2N
r
i
Note that the Cournot equilibrium industry output is
^
Q =
^
Q(n
N
) =
^
Q(r
N
) (with a slight abuse of notation.)
The combined problem for Stage 1 and Stage 2 becomes: Find r
i
2
[0; r
max
i
], i 2 N , to maximize the net prot of the industry (knowing
that rms will be Cournot rivals in Stage 3)

net
=
1
[ P
0
(
^
Q(r
N
))]
X
i2N
h
^
P   b
i
  a
0
i
+ r
i
i
2
  (
X
i2N
e
i
(r
i
)): (11)
We propose to solve problem (11) by using a two-step procedure. In
the rst step, we x r
N
and maximize 
net
with respect to (r
1
; :::; r
n
)
subject to the constraints r
n
= (1=n)
P
i2N
r
i
and r
i
2 [0; r
max
i
]. In the
second step, we choose r
N
. The merit of this procedure is that in the
rst step, because r
N
is xed, the Cournot equilibrium industry output
is xed, and so is the price
^
P . This allows us to focus on the cost
minimization consideration: on the one hand, there is production and
abatement costs as reected in the rst term on the right-hand side of
(11); on the other hand, there are the lobbying costs in the second term
on the right-hand side of (11).
The rst step:
Given r
N
, dene the feasible set S(r
N
) by
S(r
N
) = f(r
1
; :::; r
n
) : 0  r
i
 r
max
i
;
X
i2N
r
i
= nr
N
g
6
Dene the vector r
2
by r
2
= (r
2
1
; :::; r
2
n
) where r
2
i
 b
i
+ a
0
i
 
^
P .
Let f(r)  (
P
i2N
e
i
(r
i
)): Then, given r
N
; the objective function (11)
becomes
max
r
 (r) 
1
[ P
0
(
^
Q(r
N
))]
kr  r
2
k
2
  f(r) (12)
where kr   r
2
k
2
is the Euclidean distance between the vector r (to be
chosen from the feasible set S(r
N
)) and the xed vector r
2
: This term
is strictly convex in r.
We will rst consider the case of ex ante identical rms.
Proposition 2.1 ( Ex ante identical rms)
(i) If f(r) is suciently convex so that  (r) is strictly concave, then
given any r
i
2 [0; r
max
], the solution is symmetric: r
i
= r
N
for all i 2 N .
(ii) If If f(r) is concave (or not too convex) so that  (r) is strictly
convex, then the solution is at a corner of the set S(r
N
): This implies
that ex ante identical rms are treated as unequals.
(iii) If  (r) is neither concave nor convex, then there may exist several
solutions in the interior of S(r
N
):
Proof: See Long and Soubeyran (1997a).2
Next, consider the case of ex ante non-identical rms. For simplicity
we assume that the function (:) is linear, so that f(r) =
P
i2N
e
i
(r
i
):
For given r
N
; dene
 
i
(r
i
) =
1
[ P
0
(
^
Q(r
N
))]
[
^
P   b
i
  a
0
i
+ r
i
]
2
  e
i
(r
i
)
We assume that  
i
(r
i
) is strictly concave. This assumption means that
the functions e
i
(r
i
) are very convex. In economic terms, this implies that
additional permits do not signicantly reduce cost. Dene y
i
=  
0
i
(r
i
)
and y
i
=  
0
i
(r
max
i
). Without loss of generality, let y
1
 y
2
 y
3
:::  y
n
.
We will assume that the heterogenous rms are not too dierent from
each other, in the following sense:
maxf 
0
j
(r
max
j
)g < minf 
0
i
(r
i
)g (13)
We obtain the following results:
Proposition 2.2 ( Ex ante non-identical rms)
If at the optimum all rms own some permits (i.e., r
i
> 0 for all
i 2 I), then, under assumption (13), there exists an integer m
+
 n
such that at the optimum, all rms in the set

M = fm
+
+ 1; :::; ng
achieve r
max
i
, and the remaining rms achieve r

i
= ( 
0
i
)
 1
() where 
and m
+
satisfy the following conditions
X
i2M
+
( 
0
i
)
 1
() = nr
N
 
X
k2

M
r
max
k
7
y
m
+   < y
m
+
+1
Proof : see the Appendix.2
The second step:
In the second step we determine r

N
. Since this involves no new
feature, to save space we will not report the computation here.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that tradeable pollution permits can be
used by oligopolists as a means of indirectly coordinating their outputs so
as to maximize industry prot, at the expense of the consumers. Often,
because of anti-trust laws, rms cannot form a cartel to allocate outputs
among themselves. They therefore have an incentive to engage in trade in
pollution permits as an indirect method of conducting anti-competitive
behaviour.
Our analysis suggests that from the point of view of ecient allo-
cation of resources, pollution standards or the classical Pigouvian tax
may be superior to tradeable pollution permits, given that rms are
oligopolists.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.2
We use the approach developed in Luenberger (1969) and Rockafellar
(1970). The Lagrangian is
L = 
"
nr
N
 
X
i2N
r
i
#
+
X
i2N
 
i
(r
i
) +
X
i2N

i
r
i
+
X
i2N

i
[r
max
i
  r
i
]
The necessary conditions are:
@L
@r
i
= y
i
  + 
i
  
i
= 0

i
r
i
= 0; 
i
 0; r
i
 0

i
[r
max
i
  r
i
] = 0; 
i
 0; [r
max
i
  r
i
]  0
Thus (i) if r
i
= 0; then  
0
i
(0)    + 
i
= 0; (ii) if r
i
= r
max
i
, then
 
0
i
(r
max
i
)  
i
= 0 and (iii) if r
i
is an interior solution, then  
0
i
(r
i
) = .
Clearly, for any pair (i; j) such that  
0
j
(r
max
j
) <  
0
i
(0), it is not possible
that r
i
= 0 and r
j
= r
max
j
.
Let

M  fi 2 N : r

i
= r
max
i
g
M
+
 fi 2 N : 0 < r

i
< r
max
i
g
M
0
 Nn(M
+
[

M) = fi 2 N j r
i
= 0g
Assume that
maxf 
0
j
(r
max
j
)g < minf 
0
i
(0)g:
In economic terms, this assumption means that the heterogenous frms
are not too dierent from each other. This assumption ensures that
M
0
is an empty set. We now characterize the optimum such that M
0
is empty (the case where M
0
is not empty can be analyzed similarly).
Dene 
i
() = ( 
0
i
)
 1
(), and let

() 
X
i2M
+
( 
0
i
)
 1
() 
X
i2M
+

i
()
Then

(

) = nr
N
 
X
j2

M
r
max
j
Note that 

is unique because 
() is strictly decreasing (as 
0
i
() =
1= 
00
i
(r
i
) < 0):We can rank the y
i
  
0
i
(r
max
i
) as follows
y
1
< y
2
< ::: < y
m
+
< y
m
+
+1
< ::: < y
n
9
where m
+
satises
y
m
+
< 

= 

 1
0
@
nr
N
 
X
j2

M
r
max
j
1
A
< y
m
+
+1
Then
r

i
= ( 
0
i
)
 1
2
4


 1
0
@
nr
N
 
X
j2

M
r
max
j
1
A
3
5
; i 2M
+
r

j
= r
max
j
; j 2

M
(Note that if the conjugate function of  
i
is denoted by  

i
, where
 

() = sup
r
i
[ (r
i
)  r
i
]
then ( 
0
i
)
 1
=  
0
i
10
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